The National Court has ruled out the possibility that the continued validity of the collective agreement prevents a strike from being called to influence collective bargaining
Judgment of the National High Court of 4 September 2026
(SAN No. 145/2026, Case No. 137/2026).
The ruling examines whether a strike called by the CGT during the negotiation process for the new company collective agreement should be classified as unlawful on the grounds that it constituted a novatory strike aimed at altering agreements previously reached during collective bargaining. The company argued that the strike action called for 14 and 17 February 2026 breached the duty of industrial peace arising both from the collective agreement remaining in force and from an agreement reached a few days earlier at the Interconfederal Mediation and Arbitration Service (SIMA) with the main trade unions.
The National High Court dismissed the claim in its entirety and took the opportunity to systematise the legal doctrine regarding so-called ‘novatory strikes’. The Chamber noted that Article 11(c) of Royal Decree-Law 17/1977 only prohibits strikes aimed at altering the terms of a collective agreement whilst it remains in force. However, this limitation must be interpreted restrictively as it affects a fundamental right recognised in Article 28 of the Spanish Constitution.
On this basis, the court considers it decisive that the applicable collective agreement had been formally terminated in December 2024. Although its normative provisions continued to apply by virtue of extended validity, the termination had already extinguished the obligations of industrial peace inherent in the agreement. Consequently, the existence of an agreement under ultra-activity did not prevent the exercise of the right to strike, nor did it automatically mean that the call for a strike constituted a novation.
The judgement recalls that the case law of the Supreme Court has consistently held that, once the agreement has been terminated, the possibility of calling a strike arises immediately, without the need to wait for the normative effects of continued validity to cease. Otherwise, workers would be deprived of one of the most important tools for defending their interests during the negotiation of the new collective agreement framework.
The company also claimed that the strike was intended to undermine the agreement reached on 4 February 2026 at the SIMA between management and the CCOO and UGT trade unions. However, the Court of Appeal also rejected this argument. In its view, that agreement cannot be regarded as a genuine end-of-strike agreement with the same legal effect as a collective agreement, as its purpose was precisely to prevent the calling of an announced strike and not to bring an existing one to an end. Furthermore, the Court emphasised that the agreement was clearly provisional in nature. It did not fully conclude the collective bargaining process; it expressly referred to subsequent developments and left various relevant matters unresolved, which continued to be the subject of negotiation over the following weeks. In fact, the final text of the collective agreement was not finalised until March 2026 and had not even been registered or published when the strike action took place.
On this basis, the Court concludes that the negotiations were still ongoing when the strike was called and that the organising trade union was fully entitled to use collective pressure as a means of seeking to influence the outcome. The aim was not to alter a current collective agreement or to undermine a final agreement that had already been finalised, but rather to intervene in a negotiation process that was still ongoing.
The ruling is of particular interest because it reaffirms that the continued validity of the collective agreement does not extend the duty of industrial peace indefinitely, and because it confirms that the right to strike remains fully in force during collective bargaining once the previous collective agreement has been terminated. The judgement thus reinforces a protective interpretation of the fundamental right to strike and limits the circumstances in which a strike may be deemed unlawful on the grounds that it constitutes a novation.