The UK is considering scrapping the advisory vote on directors’ remuneration
The United Kingdom, the first country to introduce a consultative vote by shareholders on directors’ remuneration (‘say on pay’), is now considering abolishing it. Marina Torres Díaz of ECIJA explains that on 7 September 2026, the British Government put forward for public consultation the document ‘Modernising corporate disclosure to drive long-term economic growth’, with the aim of comprehensively reforming corporate disclosure obligations – a framework it recognises as excessively complex, with overlaps and scattered requirements. Among the issues it addresses, one that has attracted the most interest in Spain is the “rationalisation” of the directors’ remuneration regime under the Companies Act 2006.
The proposal retains five key elements, including the annual disclosure of each director’s total individual remuneration, broken down by component; the statement by the chair of the remuneration committee; and the chart comparing the chief executive’s remuneration with total shareholder return (TSR) over the last ten years. It proposes to simplify certain aspects, such as the method for calculating total remuneration, and to remove others, such as the CEO-to-employee pay ratio, malus and clawback clauses, the results of annual remuneration votes, and information on executive directors’ shareholdings.
Particular attention has been drawn to the proposal to abolish the consultative vote at the annual general meeting on the annual remuneration report, on the grounds that it is a non-binding vote on a matter already approved through the triennial vote on the remuneration policy. The United Kingdom introduced this vote in 2002, based on the view that disclosure alone was not sufficient to address the gap between directors’ remuneration and companies’ results, and reinforced it in 2013 with a binding vote on the remuneration policy. Spain incorporated both requirements in 2011 and 2014.
Torres emphasises, however, that the Spanish regime is not identical to the British one. On the one hand, the vote on the remuneration report is no longer merely advisory: if it is rejected, the company may only continue to apply the current policy until the next annual general meeting, at which it must resubmit it for approval. On the other hand, companies tend to include only limited information in their policies regarding the remuneration of executive directors, particularly in relation to variable components; the annual report should therefore supplement this with a detailed description. The CNMV has for years pointed out that many reports do not explain in sufficient detail the remuneration scheme actually applied. For this reason, the ECIJA partner concludes that, whilst it may be tempting to extrapolate the British proposals to Spain, there are relevant aspects of the Spanish system that should be taken into account before reaching any conclusions.
Read the full article in Expansión.