The reversibility of remote working does not allow for its unilateral amendment: the Supreme Court reaffirms the primacy of the individual agreement

The dispute arose following the company’s decision to reduce, with effect from 1 January 2025, the percentage of remote working permitted for certain workers with disabilities, who until then had been working 100 per cent of their working hours remotely. The company took the view that, once the collective agreement governing its remote working policy had expired, it could unilaterally set a new limit of 75 per cent remote working.

The Supreme Court rejects this argument and provides a detailed interpretation of Law 10/2021 on Remote Working. The judgement notes that Article 8.1 of that Act expressly stipulates that any amendment to the conditions agreed in a remote working agreement—including the percentage of on-site work—must be formalised by agreement between the employer and the employee, in writing and prior to its implementation.

One of the most significant aspects of the ruling is the distinction between the reversibility and the amendment of remote working arrangements. The Supreme Court points out that the reversibility provided for in Article 5.3 of Law 10/2021 allows the remote working arrangement to be terminated in accordance with the terms laid down by law or by collective agreement. However, a partial alteration to its conditions, such as a reduction in the percentage of remote working, constitutes a modification of the existing agreement and not a case of reversibility. Therefore, such a modification cannot be imposed unilaterally by the employer.

The judgement also emphasises that the legal framework governing remote working assigns a central role to the individual agreement. According to the Supreme Court, negotiations regarding the introduction, continuation or modification of remote working fall within the scope of individual autonomy and cannot be superseded by unilateral management decisions or by collective agreements that provide for rights which are vested in the individual employee.

Furthermore, the Court clarifies that collective bargaining may enhance legal safeguards or establish supplementary rules on remote working, but it cannot remove the legal requirement for individual consent to amend the agreements entered into with each employee. Consequently, not even the existence of a collective agreement or a procedure under Article 41 of the Workers’ Statute can legitimise the imposition of changes to the percentage of remote working without the express consent of the employee concerned.

On this basis, the Supreme Court concludes that the reduction in the percentage of remote working was unlawful in respect of those workers who had not given their individual consent to the change. However, it clarifies that the dispute should not be analysed as a substantial collective amendment subject to the provisions of Article 41 of the Workers’ Statute, but rather as a breach of the specific requirements of the Remote Working Act. Consequently, it partially upholds the appeal and declares null and void only those changes imposed on employees who did not individually accept the reduction in their percentage of remote working.

The ruling is of particular significance for companies, as it reaffirms that changes to remote working agreements generally require a new individual agreement with each affected employee, and that collective bargaining or company-wide decisions cannot replace this legal requirement.