Entry into force of ILO Convention No. 190: what changes (and what doesn’t) for employers

On 2 October 2026, ILO Convention No. 190 on the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work will come into force in Costa Rica. The conclusion is clear: the Convention is not directly applicable and does not, in itself, create new and immediate obligations for employers. However, it may be used by the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (MTSS) and by the courts as a basis for interpretation. “Our recommendation is to have an internal policy or protocol against workplace harassment in place and to review its content in the light of the Convention,” says Daniel Valverde, partner in charge of the Employment practice at ECIJA Costa Rica.

A little background

In August 2025, the Legislative Assembly ratified Convention 190, a treaty which establishes the obligation to have an appropriate regulatory framework in place to eliminate harassment and violence in the workplace. Costa Rica has lacked specific legislation on workplace harassment: the Labour Code, in force since 1943, does not expressly mention the term ‘harassment’, and the 1995 Law against Sexual Harassment in Employment and Teaching covers only one aspect of the issue.

ILO conventions do not lay down specific regulations, but rather a minimum framework, leaving it up to each country to decide how to address the issue. In this case, there are three commitments: (1) to stipulate that harassment may occur both inside and outside the workplace (business trips, training sessions), including virtual spaces; (2) to establish or strengthen mechanisms for redress; and (3) to adopt, in consultation with workers and their representatives, an anti-harassment policy at work that goes beyond existing provisions on sexual harassment.

As regards their scope, Articles 2 and 3 protect workers and other persons in the world of work, whatever their contractual status, and apply to situations occurring during work, in connection with work or as a result of work, including communications via information technology, such as email or corporate messaging systems. Articles 9 and 10, for their part, stipulate that employers must take appropriate measures, commensurate with their degree of control, to prevent violence and harassment, including a workplace policy and the identification and assessment of risks; and that States must guarantee avenues of recourse and redress, as well as the protection of privacy and confidentiality.

What is the nature of the Convention?

Daniel Valverde replies that “the Convention is not directly applicable. It is a minimum framework that requires domestic legislative development; in practice, legislative reforms are needed to define harassment and establish streamlined procedures. Therefore, the answer to the question of what changes with its entry into force is, in reality, not much: it does not in itself create a new and immediate obligation”.

However, that does not mean it is irrelevant. The Convention can serve as an interpretative tool on two fronts: in the administrative sphere, when the MTSS investigates complaints or carries out inspections relating to workplace harassment; and in the judicial sphere, as a guiding principle for the courts. Its actual scope will depend on how it is applied by the MTSS and the courts.

The current framework: what already exists

Article 69(c) of the Labour Code obliges employers to “treat workers with due consideration, refraining from verbal or physical abuse”. This provision is to be read in conjunction with Article 19 (good faith) and Article 83 (termination of the contract with employer liability).

At the administrative level, the Labour Inspectorate’s Manual of Legal Procedures (Guideline DMT-017-2013, amended and supplemented by Guideline DMT-014-2014) regulates, in section 2.6.1, the procedure for reporting workplace harassment. It provides that: “The procedure applicable to this area of labour protection follows an inspection cycle; therefore, each and every one of the procedural stages set out in section 2.3 of this manual must be exhausted.” Furthermore, it states: “When visiting the workplace, the inspector checks whether there are internal procedures in place for receiving and dealing with complaints of workplace harassment.”

From there, the Manual distinguishes between two scenarios. If the company has an internal procedure, the inspector issues a warning to the employer, via an inspection and prevention report, to ensure that this procedure is activated and the victim’s rights are guaranteed, whilst recording the prohibition on dismissal that protects the worker making the complaint in accordance with Article 12 of the Labour Code. If the company lacks such a procedure, the complaint is handled directly by the Inspectorate.

The Manual therefore sets out three scenarios in which the Inspectorate takes direct charge of the investigation: where the employer has only one employee, where domestic service is involved, or where the company lacks an internal procedure.

It should be noted that there is no law imposing this protocol; it is an administrative provision designed to fill gaps.

The novelty: the single action

National case law has developed the concept of workplace harassment around the idea of habitual behaviour. The Second Chamber, in its ruling 655-2005, identified five characteristics: (a) intent; (b) repetition of the offence, as consistent rather than isolated behaviour; (c) duration, that is to say, that it occurs over an extended period; (d) power imbalance; and (e) the ultimate aim of causing the person to leave their post. This criterion was reiterated by the Constitutional Chamber in Ruling 15592-2008 and by the Second Chamber in Ruling 869-2015. The latter added that the employee must prove the facts and, subsequently, the employer must objectively and reasonably justify the proportionality of the measures; and cited as examples of conduct that does not constitute harassment a duly substantiated reprimand, a single instance of raising one’s voice due to a breach of procedure, or comments on mistakes accompanied by suggestions for improvement.

Here is the new development. 

Article 1 of the Convention defines “violence and harassment” as a set of unacceptable behaviours and practices, or threats of such behaviours and practices, “whether occurring once or repeatedly”, which are intended to, do, or are likely to cause physical, psychological, sexual or economic harm. This places pressure on the requirement of habituality. The concept is not entirely foreign to our system: the Law against Sexual Harassment, No. 7476, and the MTSS’s own Manual on sexual harassment already provide that serious conduct, which, having occurred on a single occasion, causes harm to the victim, is considered sexual harassment.

Even though Convention No. 190 had already been approved by the Legislative Assembly, albeit without having entered into force, the Second Chamber, in judgment No. 00797-2026, reiterated that not every labour dispute constitutes harassment: it requires systematic behaviour and malicious intent, since “without repetition or a sustained pattern, there is no harassment, even if the events cause distress”. Establishing the facts does not automatically constitute harassment; there must be a causal link between the conduct and the harm. The Chamber also distinguished between the legitimate exercise of disciplinary authority – such as warnings, guidelines or internal regulations – and harassment proper.

This position leads to the conclusion that, even under Convention 190, a single act could only constitute harassment if it is of such particular gravity as to justify waiving the requirement of habituality.In our view, a single act should only qualify as harassment when it is of such gravity as to justify waiving the requirement of habitual conduct demanded by case law. Ordinary isolated acts, such as a firm reprimand or a one-off raised voice, remain outside the scope of the concept, in line with rulings 869-2015 and 00797-2026.