Audience Rights: what was published on 28 August 2026 and what it means for the media, advertisers and brands

1. What was published?

On Friday 28 August 2026, in the evening edition of the Official Gazette of the Federation, the Agreement was published by which the Plenary Session of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission approves and issues the ‘General Guidelines for the Protection of Audiences’ Rights’, together with its Sole Annex and seven technical and formatting annexes.

One point worth clarifying from the outset: this is not a decree. There has been talk in public discourse of a “decree on audiences”, but this is in fact a Resolution of the Plenary Session of a regulatory body which issues administrative provisions of a general nature — Article 1 itself classifies them as such. The distinction is not merely cosmetic: it determines the procedure for challenging the provisions, the applicable standard of constitutional review (reservation of legislative power, hierarchical subordination, exhaustiveness) and the scope of authority to amend them subsequently.

Target audience (Art. 1): free-to-air television and radio licence holders, pay-TV and/or pay-audio licence holders, and programme providers. Does not apply to the print media or digital platforms.

An operational detail that is easily overlooked: in accordance with Article 5, all time limits specified in days are deemed to be working days. This alters the calculation of virtually all time limits in the complaints procedure.

2. What do the Guidelines set out?

2.1 The catalogue of rights (Art. 8).

Fourteen sub-sections. In addition to the well-known ones — accurate, pluralistic and timely information; that advertising must not be presented as news; criteria for distinguishing advertising from content; criteria for differentiating news from opinion; the right of reply; non-discrimination—there are three that almost no one has commented on and which have a direct operational impact:

• Section VIII: maintaining the same quality and levels of audio and video throughout the programme and during advertising breaks. The long-standing problem of adverts being played at a higher volume is now expressly regulated.
• Section XIII: adhering to broadcast timetables, giving at least 24 hours’ notice of programme changes where these are foreseeable, or before the start of the affected programme where they are not, and including parental warnings.
• Section XIV: specific rights for audiences with disabilities, including programme guides accessible via telephone, apps or the website.

2.2 Distinction between advertising and content (Articles 9 and 10)

Article 9 prohibits the presentation of advertising or propaganda as journalistic or news content. Article 10 requires the identification of all sponsorship, commercial messages, branded content or product placement. The Guidelines expressly define  branded content and product placement (Article 3, Sections X and XIII), thereby closing the door on debates as to whether or not branded content is covered.

For free-to-air and pay-TV, in commercial slots within a programme:

• The licence holder may indicate this by displaying the  ‘P’ symbol on screen in accordance with Annex 1, and this symbol may be included at the beginning and end of the slot for at least five continuous seconds.
• At the end of each programme ,  a on-screen caption must be displayed stating that the programme included commercial and/or sponsored slots, along with the logos or trade names of the brands that contracted them.
• Commercial breaks must be announced at the start and end where the continuity of the broadcast does not make this evident.

For radio and pay-TV, the same caption must be stated verbally at the end of each programme, and the start and end of commercial breaks must be announced where this is not clear.

Here, precision is required: the ‘P’ symbol was worded in discretionary terms (‘may’, ‘shall be permitted’), not mandatory ones. The draft submitted for consultation stated “shall”. What is mandatory, however, is the  closing caption featuring the logos. And on radio, the draft required a prior and clear verbal statement that the content was advertising; the final version replaced this with the caption at the end of the programme.

2.3 News content versus opinion (Art. 11).

On television: captions, bumpers, on-screen messages or any other element that allows the viewer to clearly identify whether the presenter, reporter or commentator is expressing opinions and news items indiscriminately, or primarily opinions. These must be included at least at the start and end of the programme, not on a permanent basis. On radio and pay-audio services, equivalent audio elements must also be included at the start and end. This applies to licence holders and programme providers.

2.4 Duty of care in news reporting (Art. 12).

The most hotly debated article. Its final wording:

Licensees […] shall adopt the necessary measures to preserve the plurality and accuracy of information, and must adhere to the editorial criteria and values set out in their Codes of Ethics for the handling of news content.

The draft submitted for consultation required measures to be taken to avoid disseminating false or out-of-context information, or presenting historical information as if it were current. That wording has been removed. The explanatory memorandum explains the change: the wording was brought into line with Article 6, Section B, Subsection III of the Constitution, which mandates the preservation of the plurality and accuracy of information in broadcasting services.

Correspondingly, Article 18, Section I, sub-section (b) requires that the Code of Ethics contain editorial criteria and values for the handling of news information that ensure that, at the time of publication, there were sufficient grounds to conclude that the news was true. It is, in essence, a standard of prior journalistic diligence, not an obligation to guarantee the truth.

2.5 Right of reply and accessibility (Articles 13 to 16).

The right of reply is referred in full to the relevant regulatory legislation; the additional obligation is of an informative nature: to publish on the website that the right exists and that, where applicable, the correction will be broadcast free of charge via the same medium. On accessibility, the Guidelines are more stringent than has been reported: closed captioning with seven technical parameters (synchronisation, placement, number of lines, font, contrast), dubbing into Spanish and Mexican Sign Language, available for at least one news programme and one children’s programme with the widest national audience, broadcast between 06:00 and 24:00, for commercial and public free-to-air television channels with coverage exceeding 50 per cent of the national territory. For live programmes, a delay of up to five seconds is permitted.

2.6 The two instruments: Code of Ethics and Ombudsman (Articles 17 to 38).

Code of Ethics. Seven minimum requirements (Article 18), including editorial criteria on the protection of vulnerable groups, non-discrimination and the prohibition of hate speech; explicit reference to the rights of audiences; mission, vision and editorial identity; programming identity; and mechanisms for appointing the Ombudsman. Each multi-programme channel requires its own Code (Article 19), although channels with the same national programming identity share one. It must be registered in the Public Register of Concessions (Art. 20), with tacit approval after 15 days (Art. 21), published on the website, digital media and on-site within 10 days of the certificate of registration (Art. 22), and is applicable and enforceable from the date of notification of the certificate of registration (Art. 24).

Ombudsman.  Mandatory for free-to-air television and radio. Requirements (Art. 27): aged 30 or over; experience in communications, law, broadcasting or telecommunications; no previous conviction for an intentional offence carrying a prison sentence of more than one year; and no employment with the concessionaire in the preceding two years. Extensive disqualifications relating to family ties, shareholdings and legal representation (Art. 29). Appointment for three years, renewable up to two times, whilst observing the principle of gender equality (Art. 34). Specified grounds for termination (Art. 35). The concessionaire is obliged to provide the Ombudsman with technical and material resources , ensuring their independence and impartiality, without direct or indirect interference (Art. 37). The Ombudsman must publish and submit to the Commission a  half-yearly report in April and October (Art. 38, para. V).

For pay-TV and pay-audio services, appointing an Ombudsman is optional: they may instead designate a department responsible for handling complaints under the same rules (Art. 51).

2.7 The complaints procedure (Articles 39 to 50).

1. Submission: to the licence holder’s registered office, the Ombudsman’s registered office or the designated email address, within 7 days of the content being broadcast (Art. 45). It must include the complainant’s name and official identification, an email address for notifications, details identifying the content, and the grounds for the complaint and supporting evidence (Art. 44). The complaint may be based on a breach of the licence holder’s own Code of Ethics. The Ombudsman may not refuse to accept a complaint on the grounds that it does not meet the requirements.
2. Pre-hearing procedure: 3 days to address the issue, 5 days to rectify it. If the complaint is dismissed, the complainant may appeal to the Commission, which may order that the complaint be admitted and processed (Art. 45).
3. Request: once the complaint has been admitted, within 5 days the Ombudsman requests a report and audio/video evidence from the broadcaster; the broadcaster must respond within 5 days (Art. 46).
4. Determination and Recommendation: the Ombudsman decides whether or not a breach has occurred. If so, she issues a Recommendation for the content to be rectified or amended, with corrective measures. Notification is issued within 3 days and the licensee must publish it on its website within the following 24 hours  (Art. 47).
5. Compliance: the licence holder reports on the actions taken within 5 days, extendable by a further 5 days; the Ombudsman issues a Compliance Analysis (Art. 48).
6. Intervention by the Commission (Art. 49): this takes place at the request of the complainant (if the matter is not resolved or is resolved after the deadline) or of the Ombudsman (if the concessionaire fails to respond). The Commission issues a formal warning to the concessionaire, with the threat of initiating disciplinary proceedings.
7. Overall time limit: the Ombudsman must deal with the complaint within a maximum of 20 days (Article 42), which may be suspended on the grounds of precaution or objection.

2.8 Supervision and sanctions (Articles 52 and 53).

The Commission supervises through monitoring, formal notices “or any other action deemed necessary”. Infringements are penalised in accordance with Article 295 of the Act — not Article 282, as stated in the draft bill and as reported by much of the press — with a fine ranging from 0.01 per cent to 1 per cent of taxable income.

This change in reference is highly significant, and the preamble itself explains why: Article 295 limits the grounds for sanctions to (i) failing to make defence mechanisms available to the public and (ii) failing to appoint a Public Defender or failing to issue Codes of Ethics; and it also provides that no penalty shall be imposed if compliance is achieved voluntarily without a prior request, inspection visit or verification, and that for a first offence, the Commission shall issue a single warning.

2.9 Transitional provisions.

3. Comments

3.1 What needs to be acknowledged

1. The provision regarding ‘false’ or ‘taken out of context’ information as a standalone obligationhas been removed. Its replacement with the duty to preserve plurality and truthfulness – enshrined in the constitution and implemented through a standard of due diligence – prevents the regulator from having to assess the truthfulness of a news item.
2. The reference in Article 282 to Article 295regarding sanctions has been amended, thereby reducing the scope of punishable conduct to two objective scenarios and introducing a warning for a first offence and an exemption for voluntary compliance.
3. The Commission’s intervention was limited to procedure, not the substance: it urges a response, but does not review whether the Ombudsman’s determination was correct.
4. The advertising identification requirement was relaxed from ‘must’ to ‘may’ regarding the ‘P’ symbol, in response to the technical production challenges raised during the consultation.

A Report on the Findings of the public consultation was published on the CRT’s website, and the Agreement itself documents this. The legitimate criticism is not that it does not exist, but that the Agreement acknowledges that the comments were assessed  ‘in general terms’, without a response broken down by individual observation.

3.2 The structural problem: who is keeping watch?

The most serious objection is that the CRT is not the IFT. The autonomous constitutional body (IFT) ceased to exist and its functions were transferred to a regulator embedded within the Agency for Digital Transformation and Telecommunications.

The inter-American standard on broadcasting, developed by the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR, requires that the body enforcing audiovisual regulation be independent of political power and of the interests of the regulated sector. No set of guidelines, however well drafted, can remedy a lack of institutional independence. And when the regulator reports to the Executive, even a strictly procedural power operates with a different impact on newsrooms.

Furthermore, Article 6 reserves the administrative interpretation of the Guidelines to the Plenary of the Commission itself. The safeguard clause in Article 2 — which prohibits interpreting the instrument as a restriction on editorial freedom or as prior censorship — is necessary, but it is interpreted by the very body whose independence is in question.

3.3 A problem of legal definition.

Article 53 provides that “breaches of the provisions set out in these Guidelines” shall be penalised in accordance with Article 295 of the Act. However, Article 295 contains two specific offences: failing to provide mechanisms for defence, and failing to appoint a defence counsel or issue a code of ethics. The wording of Article 53 is broad; the provision to which it refers is narrow.

This asymmetry gives rise to two incompatible interpretations:

• Restrictive interpretation: only the two specific cases set out in Article 295 are punishable. Consequently, failure to comply with Article 10 (advertising identification), Article 11 (distinction between information and opinion), Article 12 (duty of care in reporting) or Articles 14 to 16 (accessibility) carries no direct penalty . A significant portion of the Guidelines would therefore constitute an imperfect regulation.
• Broad interpretation: Article 53 expands the list of offences by means of a general administrative provision, referring to a penalty provided for other types of conduct. This is in direct conflict with the principles of specific definition and exhaustiveness in administrative penalty matters and with the requirement for statutory provision set out in Article 14 of the Constitution.

The same problem arises in Article 50: if the concessionaire fails to comply with the Ombudsman’s Recommendation, ‘the corresponding disciplinary proceedings shall be initiated’. On what grounds, given that disregarding the recommendation of an internal body does not fall under either of the two scenarios set out in Article 295? And in Article 46, where the concessionaire is warned that disciplinary proceedings will be initiated if it fails to submit its report to the Ombudsman.

This is, by far, the most contentious aspect of the instrument, and there is no need to invoke freedom of expression to raise this point.

3.4 The requirement for statutory authorisation.

Article 12 no longer refers the content of the duty exclusively to codes of ethics: it establishes a substantive duty —to preserve plurality and truthfulness— taken literally from Article 6(B)(III) of the Constitution, and only subsequently refers to the media organisation’s own editorial criteria as a means of compliance. This reduces, without eliminating it, the problem that the SCJN identified in the amparo under review 499/2020, where it declared unconstitutional the second and third paragraphs of what was then Article 256 of the LFTyR for violating the principle of legal reservation by referring to codes of ethics for the definition of the content of audiences’ rights.

What keeps the tension alive is something else: Article 44(III) expressly acknowledges that the complaint is based on a breach of the licence holder’s Code of Ethics. In other words, the code — an instrument of self-regulation approved by the licensee itself — becomes the benchmark for a procedure, the breach of which may lead to intervention by the Commission. The same act may constitute a breach for one licence holder but not for another, depending on what each has set out in its code.

This is not an insurmountable flaw—the system relies on the fact that the code is enforceable from the moment of its registration, Article 24— but it requires the CRT to specify, through interpretative criteria, the extent to which the code is enforceable and where that enforceability ends.

3.5 Independence of the Ombudsman.

The Guidelines go considerably further than was originally envisaged: a three-year term of office, limited extensions, disqualifications due to family ties and shareholdings, a prohibition on having worked for the concessionaire in the preceding two years, an express obligation on the concessionaire to ensure independence and impartiality without direct or indirect interference, and a public half-yearly report.

The problem lies in Article 35, section III: it is grounds for termination of the appointment  “the failure to respond to requests for information made by the Concessionaire”. The concessionaire may request information from the person adjudicating complaints against it, and failure to comply with such requests results in the termination of the appointment. This is at odds with Article 37. It creates a source of pressure on an official appointed by the concessionaire itself.

This can be rectified by an interpretative approach that limits such requests to administrative matters and expressly excludes the substance of the complaints under consideration.

3.6 Asymmetries that may cause friction.

Broadcasters. They are subject to Articles 11 (information/opinion), 12 (due diligence) and 52–53 (supervision and sanctions), but are not obliged to issue a Code of Ethics or appoint an Ombudsman (Articles 18 and 25 refer only to licence holders). They are subject to the duty without the means to comply, and are potentially exposed to sanctions without a dedicated channel for addressing concerns.

Pay-TV and pay-radio. The Ombudsman is optional (Article 51). Two audiences facing the same grievance will be afforded different safeguards depending on whether they receive the signal via free-to-air broadcasting or by cable.

Broadcasting versus digital. The same news programme, with the same presenter and the same sponsored content, is subject to complaints procedures, closing captions, a code of ethics and the Ombudsman’s office if broadcast on free-to-air television, and to none of these if distributed on YouTube or as a podcast. From the perspective of freedom of expression, not regulating platforms is the correct decision. However, it leads to regulatory arbitrage in a market where audience migration has already taken place.

3.7 A contradiction between the text of the Act and Annex 1.

Article 10 sets out the use of the ‘P’ symbol in discretionary terms: the licence holder may display the symbol, and it may be included at the beginning and end for at least five seconds.

Annex 1, in its technical provisions, stipulates that the symbol must be displayed at the beginning and end of content containing commercial breaks for at least five continuous seconds.

A technical annex cannot render mandatory what the provisions left discretionary. Article 10 takes precedence. However, the contradiction lies in the published text and will give rise to enquiries, divergent interpretations and, eventually, an unfounded demand.

3.8 Observations on the complaints procedure.

The time limit of 7 days. Counted from the publication of the content, and even if these are working days, this is too short a period for a human right whose exercise depends on the individual realising they have been affected, identifying the defendant, gathering evidence and formalising the complaint. It effectively acts as a limitation period.

Official identification. Article 44 requires a name and official identification. Whilstthis is understandable in terms of due process and data protection, it precludes anonymous complaints and may deter reports concerning politically sensitive content. A mechanism allowing the complainant’s identity to remain confidential from the media, whilst being disclosed to the Ombudsman, would resolve this tension.

3.9 Protection of personal data.

Article 40 holds the Ombudsman, the Licencees and the Broadcasters responsible for the proper processing and protection of personal data to which they have access whilst handling complaints, in accordance with the Federal Law on the Protection of Personal Data Held by Private Parties. The reference is brief, but it opens up a compliance front that needs to be properly assessed.

Firstly, a point that many privacy notices have not yet taken on board: the competent authority is no longer the INAI. The Institute was abolished following the constitutional reform on organisational simplification published on 20 December 2024, and the new LFPDPPP —published on 20 March 2025 and in force from the following day— assigned its functions regarding the private sector to the Secretariat for Anti-Corruption and Good Governance, which exercises them through the decentralised body Transparency for the People. In response to its decisions, the appropriate course of action is to seek an ‘amparo’ before specialised courts and tribunals, not a nullity action before the TFJA. Any compliance document that continues to refer to the INAI is out of date, and this is the first thing that is detected during an audit.

On that basis, there are three specific obligations:

• Define roles. A decision must be made as to whether the Data Protection Officer operates as an independent data controller or as a data processor for the concessionaire. This is not an academic discussion: it determines who is accountable to the authority, who must issue the privacy notice, and whether a processing agreement is required. The functional independence required by Article 37 and data ownership do not necessarily refer to the same entity.
• Update privacy notices. Complaint files contain the name, official identification number, email address and, frequently, the political views of the complainant — sensitive data when the complaint concerns news content. The notice must distinguish between necessary and voluntary purposes, and the processing of sensitive data results in more severe penalties.
• Balancing retention and deletion. Articles 38 and 46 require a record to be kept of all matters and for audio and video evidence to be retained for submission upon request. The new LFPDPPP introduced the concept of a retention period with a duty to delete data upon expiry. Both duties are compatible, but only if the retention period and its regulatory justification are expressly documented. Retaining data indefinitely ‘just in case’ is no longer a defensible position.

4. Proposals

Five measures which the CRT may adopt by way of interpretative guidance — Article 6 grants it this power — without amending the legislation:

1. Explicitly resolve the contradiction in Article 53, specifying that the only conduct liable to sanctions is that falling under the two scenarios set out in Article 295 of the Act, and that the other provisions of the Guidelines operate through the complaints procedure rather than the sanctions procedure.

2. To clarify the contradiction between Article 10 and Annex 1 regarding the discretionary nature of the ‘P’ symbol.

3. Narrow the scope of Article 35(III), excluding the substance of complaints currently under consideration from the range of requests that the Concessionaire may make to the Ombudsman.
4. Specify the scope of the enforceability of the Code of Ethics as a criterion for complaints in accordance with Article 44(III).
5. Publish a detailed response to the comments received during the public consultation, going beyond the general assessment provided in the Report on Considerations.

5. What to do and when

Free-to-air television and radio concessionaires.

Before 6 November 2026:

• Draft the Code of Ethics incorporating the seven elements set out in Article 18, including the standard of “minimum criteria for concluding that the news report was accurate”. One for each multi-programme channel, unless there is a common programme identity at national level.
• Submit the application for registration in the Public Register of Licences using the form in Annex 3.
• Identify and propose a Ombudsman, verifying the requirements of Article 27 and the disqualifications set out in Article 29 —in particular, that they have not worked for the licence holder in the preceding two years— using the forms in Annexes 4, 5 and 6.

Within 10 and 5 days respectively following the relevant certifications: publish the Ombudsman’s code and contact details on the website, digital media and at premises.

Before 21 December 2026: implement closed captions in accordance with Annex 2, dubbing into Spanish and Mexican Sign Language for at least one news programme and one children’s programme with the highest audience figures.

With immediate effect: design the internal workflow for the complaints procedure. The deadlines are short and interlinked — 5 days to issue a request, 5 for the department to respond, 3 to notify, 24 hours to publish the Recommendation — and without a defined process, they cannot be met. Retaining audio and video records is now a practical obligation, as Article 46 requires them upon request. Coordinate this process with the personal data department, in accordance with section 3.9.

Pay-TV and pay-audio licence holders

Mandatory Code of Ethics within the same timeframes. Optional Ombudsman: decide whether to appoint one or establish a responsible department governed by the same rules. The second option is cheaper but subjects the department to the same timeframes without the guarantees of independence that protect the Ombudsman.

Programme providers

Subject to Articles 11 and 12 and the supervisory regime, with no obligation to adopt a code of ethics or appoint an ombudsman. It is advisable to document internally compliance with the distinction between information and opinion and with the duty of care, and to negotiate with the licence holders regarding the allocation of liability for breaches arising from the content provided.

Advertisers, agencies and brand owners.

• Their brand name or logo will appear in the closing caption of any content for which they have contracted advertising space or sponsorship. The final version removed the phrase ‘where applicable’ that was contained in the draft. This is not optional for the media outlet.
• Branded content and product placement are expressly defined and subject to identification. The economic rationale behind brand integration — which is perceived as a natural part of the content — changes when the integration is highlighted.
• Review the clauses on regulatory compliance and risk allocation in existing sponsorship, brand integration and advertising contracts. The fine is imposed on the Licencee, but the reputational risk is shared, and the Ombudsmen’s Recommendations are made public within 24 hours thereafter.
• In new contracts, include explicit identification obligations in accordance with the Guidelines, declarations and warranties from the media outlet regarding the current registration of its Code of Ethics, and mutual indemnity.
• Review campaigns already produced where advertising runs beyond 27 September.

Impact on M&A (mergers and acquisitions).

From 27 September 2026, compliance with these Guidelines will form part of the due diligence process in the acquisition of concessionaires or broadcasters. Failure to register the Code of Ethics or the omission to appoint the Ombudsman within the transitional deadlines will constitute regulatory contingencies verifiable via public records: both actions are recorded in the Public Register of Concessions, meaning verification is swift and the finding is difficult to dispute.

It is advisable to adjust the representations and warranties and the conditions precedent in the sale and purchase agreement accordingly. Two practical points:

• The one-off warning under Article 295 is a benefit that can only be used once. A target that has already been warned reaches closing with the risk of an actual fine in the event of a subsequent breach, which alters the risk profile compared to one that has never been subject to a formal notice.
• The exemption for voluntary compliance  —which applies only if no formal notice, inspection visit or verification has taken place—means that rectifying the situation before completion is materially cheaper than doing so afterwards. This is a useful argument for negotiating a condition precedent requiring rectification rather than a price adjustment.

6. Means of defence

For anyone who considers that the Guidelines exceed the scope of the Act or infringe rights, the recourse is an indirect application for judicial protection against administrative provisions of a general nature.

Nature of the regulation. The obligations to issue a Code of Ethics and to register an Ombudsman arise simply upon entry into force, without any specific act of enforcement, which supports the view that it is a self-enforcing regulation and triggers the 30-day period from the date it comes into force. Other provisions — such as graphic identification, pleas and accessibility — allow for a hetero-applicative interpretation, with an open time limit until the first act of application.

7. Conclusion

The Guidelines published on 28 August 2026 are markedly better than the draft that preceded them. They removed the provision that would have made the State the arbiter of journalistic accuracy, amended the sanctions framework to a fixed catalogue with a warning for a first offence, and limited the regulator’s intervention to procedural compliance.

What they do not resolve—because it is beyond their remit—is that the body responsible for enforcing them no longer enjoys the constitutional autonomy required by the inter-American standard. And what they have handled poorly is a technical issue: Article 53, drafted in general terms, which refers to a legal provision setting out specific cases. This can be rectified by a decision of the Plenary. It should be rectified before 27 September.

For the media, the next seventy days are a period of compliance. For brands and agencies, they are a period of contract review. And the question that will determine whether this regulation protects audiences or merely manages formalities remains the one raised during the consultation:what recourse is left to the complainant when their complaint is unsuccessful and the Commission can only verify that the procedure has been followed?